Samstundes tek rasande tullingar til å knusa vindauge, kasta molotov-cocktails og gå laus på politi og meiningsmotstandarar, og støyen er garantert (kvifor i #¤%#¤ skal det alltid gå utover Jan Thomas forresten – eg tviler på han har noko slags form for skuld i israelsk krigføring). Dermed treng ein ikkje akkurat leita lenge for å finna djupt reaksjonære, innvandrarfiendtlege og hatske innlegg, til dels med støtte til tiltak som ville vera stikk i strid med menneskerettserklæringa. Når folk i eit moderne, demokratisk land som Noreg kallar politikarane for “landsforrædarpolitikar“, snakkar om “landskadelige elementer”, tek til å gå til åtak på sjølve menneskerettane – og att på til hevdar å gjera det til forsvar for ytringsfridomen - ja, så bør det vera grunn til å stilla spørsmål ved kva slags politisk regime dei eigentleg ynskjer seg. Det vil seia: også denne retorikken er til å kjenna att.

I all denne støyen kjennest det nesten litt meiningslaust å repetera at det finst mange menneske i både Israel og Palestina som er engasjert i arbeidet for å skapa fred, men eg gjer det likevel. Også blant desse finst det moderate og meir yttarleggåande, men ein ting har dei alle til felles: dei trur at freden er mogleg, og dei er viljuge til å gjera offer for han. Ei av dei er 19 år gamle Omer Goldman, dotra til ein tidlegare toppkar i Mossad. Ho seier blant anna:

I refuse to enlist in the Israeli military. I shall not be part of an army that needlessly implements a violent policy and violates the most basic human rights on a daily basis. Like most of my peers, I too have not dared to question the ethics of the Israeli military. But when I visited the Occupied Territories I realized I see a completely different reality, a violent, oppressive, extreme reality that must be ended. I believe in service to the society I am part of, and that is precisely why I refuse to take part in the war crimes committed by my country. Violence will not bring any kind of solution, and I shall not commit violence, come what may.

Ein kan vera einig eller ueinig med Omer Goldman og hennar meir eller mindre pasifistiske grunnsyn, men utover det eg har utheva seier ho ein ting som er verkeleg interessant: nemleg at ho såg ein heilt annan røyndom i dei okkuperte områda.

Det er ikkje så vanskeleg å kjenne seg at i orda, når ein ser mange av debattane mellom norske israelsvener og norske palestinavener er det også tydeleg at dei befinn seg i høgst ulike røyndomar. Sjeldan – diverre – vågar dei å ta steget over frå den eine røyndomen til den andre. For ein palestinaven kan det vera rimeleg smertefullt å sjå Hamas for det organisasjonen er, ei retteleg ufyseleg og reaksjonær gruppe, og ein del – iallfall ytterst på venstresida – har problem med å vedgå at det var uvanleg dårlege nyhende at dei vant valet i 2006. For ein israelsven kan det på si side vera vond lesning å ta ein titt på kva 18 år gamle (og israelske) Sahar Vardi skriv om bakgrunnen for at ho nektar militæret:

I first set eyes on the occupation as a 12 year old girl. It was in a small Palestinian village south-west of Jerusalem inhabited by some 25 families most of whom well educated, constructers, PEO employees. They did not seem to be any different to me than most people I saw walking dawn the streets. The only visible difference was that they had green ID’s.

As a 12 year old who came to the village to replace the one inch water pipe pf the village to a two inch pipe, I did not understand the full meaning of the different colour of the ID, but I did understand the simple meaning: separation. The fact that the road to the village from Jerusalem was blocked by the IDF, the fact that a fence separated the village from its neighboring village and the different IDs – all of these came to separate me from “them” and to prove beyond a doubt that we are not equal.

I was brought up at school, and at home as well, on the so-called obvious core values such as justice, freedom, human rights and equality, and here I found out, before I even began junior high, that the state in which I live does not care for these values, and not only does it not care for them, it violates them and suppresses millions of people so that I could enjoy the “freedom” they taught me everyone deserves.

Ein kan vera einig eller ueinig med Sahar Fardi også, men antisemitt er ho iallfall ikkje, og hennar ståstad kan utvilsamt vera med på å gje nordmenn ei breiare forståing av konflikta, uavhengig av om dei er israelvenar eller palestinasupportarar. Sahar Fardi er med på å gjera biletet meir komplekst, og meir ubegripeleg, og det kan mange av både palestinavenar og israelsvenar trenga, i røyndomer som framstår som så svart-kvite at det einaste som gjenstår er å laina opp sjakkbrettarmeane.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wpWYFoSrmRA

Difor: ta steget over. Sjå inn i den andre røyndomen. Freist å forstå han. Musikk kan vera ein bra stad å byrja. Her kan palestinavenane læra noko om Israel frå sjølvaste Melodi Grand Prix(!).

Her det israelske bidraget til Eurovision Song Contest frå 2007. Litt vitsande, leikande og påverka av kletzmer-musikk? Teapacks er neppe Israels mest tungsindige og seriøse band, for å seia det på den måten, men teksten seier likevel ein del om den israelske frykta, ei djuptgåande frykt med openberre historiske årsaker og djupe årsaker også i dagens verda, og ei frykt ein må skjøna i det minste litt av dersom ein skal skjøna noko som helst av konflikta. I den engelske delen av sangen heiter det blant anna:

And I don’t wanna die
I wanna see the flowers bloom
Don’t wanna go kaput kaboom
And I don’t wanna cry
I wanna have a lot of fun just sitting in the sun
But nevertheless

He’s gonna push the button, push the button
Push the bu… push the bu… push the button
Push the button, push the button
Push the bu… push the bu… push the button

Gløym det ironiske ved at Israel truleg er den einaste atommakta i regionen – om du lurer er det nemleg denne mannen dei syng om. Blant dei hebraiske versa som følgjer kjem dette:

Ulay ze khad miday
Tzarikh lashir shirey dkalim, shirey midbar lelo dgalim
Ani od khay, khay, khay
Ve’im yamshikh lihiyot mafkhid, rak az ani agid:

Eller i engelsk omsetjing:

Maybe it’s too sharp
We should sing palm tree songs, desert songs with no flags
I’m still alive, alive, alive
And if it keeps on being scary, only then will I say:

Og så kjem refrenget på ny: “I’m gonna push the button, push the button, push the bu… push the bu… push the button”. Til lystig song å vera er dette svært deprimerande greier. Deprimerande er også denne – etter mi meining – musikalsk sett relativt fengjande rap-låten.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZqbDiN2uYcQ

Både israelsvenar og palestinavenar treng å gløyma ein heil del av det dei har lært om dei skal byrja å forstå andre enn dei dei sjølv har laga heiagjeng for. Israelsvenane må til dømes gløyma alt pratet om at palestinarane ikkje finst, og i staden byrja å høyra etter også når palestinarane snakkar, og ikkje berre for å leita fram mest mogleg faenskap i det dei seier. Rap-gruppa i videoen ovanfor, DAM (arabisk for “evigvarande”, hebraisk for “blod”) består ikkje ein gong av palestinarar, men av israelske arabarar – og teksten er ikkje akkurat fredsæl, sjølv om bandet i ein annan song omtalar dei jødiske israelarane som syskenborn og sjølv om dei også har samarbeidd med eit israelsk rockeband om ein fredssong.

Teksten i “Min erhabi?” (Kven er terrorist?) fortel mykje om det verdsbiletet som ligg til grunn for mykje av palestinarane si framferd, eit verdsbilete prega av førestillinga av at ein har vorte frykteleg urettvist behandla og at dei israelske myndigheitene er alt anna enn demokratiske. Her i engelsk omsetjing:

Who’s a terrorist?
I’m a terrorist?
How am I a terrorist when you’ve taken my land?
Who’s a terrorist?
You’re the terrorist!
You’ve taken everything I own while I’m living in my homeland
You’re killing us like you’ve killed our ancestors
You want me to go to the law?
What for?
You’re the Witness, the Lawyer, and the Judge!
If you are my Judge
I’ll be sentenced to death
You want us to be the minority?
To end up the majority in the cemetery?
In your dreams!

You’re a Democracy?
Actually it’s more like the Nazis!
Your countless raping of the Arabs’ soul
Finally impregnated it
Gave birth to your child
His name: Suicide Bomber
And then you call him a terrorist?

Det det israelsk-arabiske rapbandet presenterer her er lett å sjå på som ei YouTube-sending frå ein annan røyndom, og eg er sikker på at eventuelle israelsvenar som les dette vil vera snare med både å kritisera innhaldet, referansen til nazisme og dei ymse påstandane i denne teksten. Det er det nok av grunnar til, men israelsvenane er samstundes nøydde til å stilla seg eit spørsmål, om dei ynskjer å skjøna noko som helst: Korleis kan røyndomen sjå så forskjellig ut for desse menneska, folk som bur i Israel, og bur i områder som ikkje er styrt av verken det korrupte Fatah eller det hatske Hamas? Her nyttar ikkje dei vanlege og enkle forklaringsmodellane.

Eg er ikkje av dei som har trekt klåre konklusjonar om Israel og Palestina. Ikkje har eg tenkt å gjera det heller, eg føler meg langt frå kompetent. Men av israelsvenar har eg likevel vorte skulda for å vera antisemitt, mens palestinafans har skulda meg for å vera både rasist og i lomma på Pentagon (det siste åtaket har nesten ein slags sjarme ved seg, på utruleg-dårleg-B-kultfilm-måten). Ei nesten konsekvent skulding frå hardcore-representantar på “båe” sider er også å kalla meg kunnskapslaus; noko eg i dette spørsmålet gladeleg vedgår. Eg veit ikkje om det var medan eg studerte religionsvitskap eller medan eg freista å slita meg gjennom bibelsk hebraisk og midtaustenhistorie, men ein eller annan stad nådde eg eitt punkt der eg byrja å tru at eg hadde skjøna ein del om Israel-Palestina-konflikta.

Så skjøna eg at eg eigentleg ikkje skjøna noko som helst. Men eg trur iallfall at eg kanskje har forstått ein ting: den beste måten ein som nordmann kan jobba for fred er å utfordra eindimensjonale førestillingar om “jødar” og “arabarar”, eindimensjonale idear som eksisterer i hopetal og vel så det, både i Israel, i Palestina og i Noreg. Verda er ikkje så enkel som mange vil ha det til. Ikkje ein gong alle israelsk-arabiske rap-artistar tenkjer likt.

“I mitt hjerte”, israelsk-palestinsk fredssong framført av David Broza og Wisam Murad, 2006.

Les meir her.

What is Hamas infrastructure if not the ambient support of the population? Doesn’t this attack make support stronger in the long run? Can any ground operation hope to topple the regime? What will stop the attack if not world opinion, that will not think about missiles on Shderot, but a “disproportionate response” to missiles on Shderot? Come to think of it, will they not think about Gaza under siege and what brought the place to desperate poverty? How will West Bankers react when they see Hamas standing up and dying while they feel the settlements growing around them?

And how will Egyptians react? And Jordanians? And Israeli Arabs, who are spontaneously demonstrating against the attack? And the Intel board, whose $4.5 billion dollar fab is in range? How do we build a future with Palestine when we are seen through a prism of vendetta? Will not the families and widening circles around the dead hate you forever? Do not terrorists come mainly from the ranks of youth who are ashamed to have survived? Was there not another way all along, which we cannot see now?

OUR GENERALS DO not address these questions. That is not their job. They speak instead about the need for hasbara, literally “explanation,” public relations, those critical soft skills the people in the Foreign Ministry are supposed to have, but judging from the world’s reaction seem not to have in abundance, at least, not to compare with the competence of generals, proven once again.

(Sjå også bloggposten han har kalla Teaching a Lesson – Appendix.)

Spørsmåla Avishai peiker på er viktigare enn mykje av det som vert diskutert i norsk bloggosfære, eller i norsk opinion elles. Difor vil eg gjerne utfordra israelsvenane blant norske bloggarar til å både lesa og kommentera Avishai sin artikkel. Palestinavenene, også, når eg tenkjer meg om.

Det er ei historie eg elles berre har fått servert i nazipropaganda (men eit google-søk avslører at det også er andre som repeterer det, blant anna islamistiske grupper), og det er ei historie ein må ha ein minst talt mangelfull kjennskap til europeisk-jødisk historie for å svelgja.

Andre irrelevante argument er tilsynelatande meir tilforlatelege. Nokre nyttar faktisk historie til sin fordel, og hevdar at den eine eller den hi folkegruppa har meir hevd på området. Men sjølvsagt har ingen av folkegruppene i området (og det er fleire enn to) kome ut av svarte hol. Dersom ein ikkje har visjonar om etnisk reinsing – og det likar eg å tru at få i Noreg har – er det fullstendig irrelevant kven som kan seiast å ha mest eller minst hevd til landet. Dette er snakk om folk. Som bur der. Og som har budd der i generasjonar. Som har heimane sine der, og er fødde og vaksne opp der.

Eit klassisk argument frå israelvenane si side er at palestinarane ikkje finst; dei er eigentleg berre arabarar – og arabarane har jo så mange land allereie. Her er det Olsen sjølv som syndar. I motsetnad til den anonyme palestinavenen han hadde på vitjing baserer han seg i det minste på fakta: ja, det finst mange arabiske land, nei, få av dei har særleg til overs for Israel. Argumentet han leverer er ein avart av eit anna argument som dukkar opp på ymse debattsider og bloggar om og om igjen. Olsen skriv det ikkje, men i forlenginga av hans argument kjem dette: Palestinarane finst ikkje. Dei er berre ein konstruksjon.

Ingen av dei palestinarane eg har møtt har verka spesielt konstruerte; det er ikkje snakk om golemar dette, sjølv om metaforen kanskje klaffar i blant. Men javisst: nasjonaliteten palestinar er i høgaste grad ein konstruksjon, ein konstruksjon som vaks fram som eit resultat av arabisk og syrisk-palestinsk nasjonalisme tidleg i førre hundreår, og som seinare har vorte utvikla vidare; kanskje særleg etter 1967.

Det er grunn til å minna om at nasjonaliteten israelar i aller høgaste grad også er konstruert (og ei vidareutvikling av ein jødisk nasjonalisme som vaks fram på om lag same tid som den syriske). Nasjonaliteten belgiar er så konstruert at mange i Belgia fnys av han, og nasjonaliteten nordmann er også konstruert. Med mindre ein ynskjer å dra inn raseteoriar, og det mistenkjer eg få for å vilja, er nasjonar ikkje å betrakta som naturfenomen; dei er kulturelle fenomen. Og som kulturelt fenomen er palestinaren ein utvilsam røyndom.

Sjølv om dei snakkar same språk (men høgst ulike dialekter) og i stor grad (men slett ikkje utelukkande) praktiserer ulike variantar av same religion så kan ikkje alt frå marokkanarar til irakarar og jemenittar reduserast til ei einaste monoton kulturell gruppe. Ein kan gjerne kalla palestinarane arabarar, men det er ikkje relevant. Dersom israelsk politikk er feil, er den feil sjølv om landet Jordan finst, og uavhengig av kven som budde i Hebron for 2.000 år sidan. Israelsk politikk kan ikkje gjerast verken lettare eller tyngre å forsvara gjennom å peika på den palestinske nasjonaliteten som ein konstruksjon. Slike argument er beint fram innhaldslause konstruksjonar.

Eit anna innhaldslaust argument er at Israel er så lite. “På størrelse med Hedmark fylke”, skriv Sondre Olsen. Javisst. Men spelar det noko rolle? Eg skjønar godt Israel sitt behov for å forsvara seg, og det at landet er lite kan nok seiast å understreka dette behovet. Men dersom forsvaret er av ei form som ikkje let seg forsvara speler det inga rolle om landet er lite eller stort. Dersom forsvaret tek ei form som jamvel er eigna til å gjera konflikta endå djupare og endå meir uoverkomeleg, ja, så det er like kritikkverdig uavhengig av flatemål.

Hamas er ei djupt reaksjonær, motbydeleg og pseudofascistisk gruppe, og det er synd og skam at norske venstreradikalarar finn det for godt å ha sympati med slike grupper. Når professor Daniel Heradstveit finn det for godt å seia at Hamas like gjerne kan betraktast som “frihetskjempere” som som “en terroristorganisasjon” set eg att og lurer på kva slags fridom det kan vera Hamas kjemper for. Deira styre i Gaza har ikkje akkurat vore prega av liberalitet, for å seia det forsiktig.  Når Stian Oen i ein kommentar hjå bloggaren VamPus vel å fokusera på at Hamas er ein “geriljabevegelse (…) med betydelig folkelig støtte som står opp mot mot undertrykking og okkupasjon i regi av verdens femte største militærmakt”, framstår det som like pussig. Om Hamas kan kallast “geriljabevegelse” eller ikkje er strengt teke irrelevant: det gjer ikkje dei stadige rakettangrepa mot stader i det sørlege Israel verken meir eller mindre moralske, og det gjer heller ikkje Israel sitt tilsvar verken meir eller mindre riktig.

I høve Israel sitt åtak på Hamas er det tre spørsmål som burde diskuterast, og som i stor grad har forsvunne frå også denne Israel-Palestina-debatten.

Det fyrste er om det er grunn til å tru at israelarane kjem til å oppnå det dei ynskjer, nemleg å knekkja ryggen på Hamas og få ein slutt på terroråtaka. Det andre er om det no er Hamas som får det slik dei ynskjer, om det israelske militæråtaket er nettopp det dei har freista å oppnå gjennom dei stadige rakettåtaka og eit utal andre provokasjonar. Det tredje spørsmålet er kva Noreg eller me nordmenn eventuelt kan gjera for å bidra til fred i området.  Eg trur ærleg talt ikkje at det er så mykje me kan gjera, men det står iallfall klart for meg kva me ikkje burde gjera: me burde ikkje støtta ein av partane – same kva for ein – meir eller mindre blindt, og basert på irrelevante, innhaldslause argument.

Men ifølgje enkelte på amerikansk høgreside speler det lite rolle. Ta berre ein titt på dette utvalet av “herleg” politisk kunst:

Ein del Obama-fans får forsåvidt som fortent. Det er ikkje til å leggja skjul på at ein del folk både i Statane og i andre land har samanlikna Bush med ymse ukoselege politiske figurar, blant anna Adolf Hitler. Mitt inntrykk av amerikansk politisk debatt er at han har vorte meir og meir polarisert; noko ikkje minst ein del bloggarar har bidrege til. Det fører til meiningslause samanlikningar og til stadige påstandar om at George W. Bush eigentleg er fascist, og at Barack Obama altså eigentleg er marxist – for ikkje å seia stalinist.

For nokre dagar sidan såg eg også ein bloggkommentator som samanlikna Obama med Enver Hoxha.

Men det stoggar ikkje der. På nettstaden faithfreedom.org – som elles er kjent for sin islamkritikk og som ofte vert sitert på norske nettforum – dukka det i september opp ein artikkel med eit namn eg ikkje maktar anna enn å le av, nemleg: “Understanding Obama: The making of a Fuehrer”.

Artikkelen er ikkje å finna på nettstaden lenger, men takk vere Google Cache har han ikkje forsvunne ned i “The Memory Hole”. Artikkelen er langt som eit vondt år, og handlar i stor grad om at Obama visst nok er ein narsissist, men du verda for ein tittel!

Det er ikkje berre i USA denne typen svada har ein viss appell. Også i Noreg snik samanlikningar med både Hitler og Stalin seg inn i den politiske debatten. Det er problematisk på to måtar. For det fyrste gjer det den offentlege samtalen ytterst ubehageleg; for det andre vanskeleggjer det kritikk av dei som faktisk stør totalitær tenkning. For joda, det finst fascistar i dagens Amerika, det finst fascistar i dagens Europa og det finst fascistar også her heime. Og det finst såvisst også folk på til dømes den skandinaviske venstresida som stadig – den dag i dag – ser på Enver Hoxha som ein helt, eller i det minste som ein stor visjonær. Stalin har stadig vener, jamvel blant aktivistar som er tilknytt partiet Raudt.

Sjølv trur eg – og veit eg tildels av erfaring – at ekstremisme, dogmatisme og totalitære idear kan utvikla seg innanfor høgst ulike politiske miljø. Også den grøne idetradisjonen, som eg sjølv høyrer heime i, har sitt å svara for på dette området. Bloggosfæra har gjort det lettare for ekstremistar å finna kvarandre og å utvikla ein politisk diskurs som er basert på å slett ikkje snakka saman, men snarare på å skjella kvarandre ut på det grovaste.

Eg kjem framleis ikkje til å nøla med å kalla folk som stør fascistisk tenkning for fascistar, heller ikkje om dei sjølve vel å kalla ideane sine for noko anna. Eg kjem ikkje til å nøla med å angripa marxistar for dei mange openberre feila i deira politiske tenkning. Eg kjem sjølvsagt heller ikkje til å leggja to fingrar imellom i min kritikk av Framstegspartiet sin innvandringspolitikk, eller av høgresida sin privatiseringskåtskap, eller av venstresida sin frykt for nær sagt alle private løysingar. Men her er mitt valløfte:

Eg kan lova at eg også kjem til å kritisera dei som samanliknar Siv Jensen med Adolf Hitler, dei som samanliknar Jens Stoltenberg med Josef Stalin og dei som samanliknar SV-politikk med politikken til Enver Hoxha. Noreg er ikkje tent med ein politisk debatt prega av den same polariseringa som det ein i betydeleg grad har sett i Statane. Noreg er tent med å ha politikarar med ulike ideal som likevel emnar å snakka med kvarandre og å ta ein pils (eller ein cola) med kvarandre. Noreg er tent med politikarar som er viljuge til kompromiss, og jamvel med politikarar som ein gong i blant toler å svelgja ein kamel.

In the paper “Europe for the Europeans: Fascist Myths of the New Order 1922-1992″ (Humanities Research Centre, 1993, also available here), he summarises Eurofascism and its ideas.

Here I will present some quotes from that paper, together with some comments of my own. My hope is to – in this way – shed light upon some of the central tenets of Eurofascism, and also to give further examples of the connections a number of European far right parties have to anti-Semitic, anti-liberal and anti-democratic groups. This will be the first of two posts tracing the ideological roots of Vlaams Belang and other European political parties of today.

The European mission of Germany. Nazi poster.

Let me begin with a quote on Mussolini:

An example is the 1931 article written for the Popolo d’Italia, 4 September, `Is the White Race Dying Out?’, which shows that official Fascism had both a supra-Italian and a racist dimension quite independently of the Pact of Steel with Nazi Germany. Mussolini’s most scholarly biographer, Renzo de Felice, points out that it was after the Ethiopian War and under the influence of the nationalist Oriani, the demographer Korherr and the philosopher Spengler that `Mussolini underwent a decisive phase of ideological evolution and involution’ which `led him to believe that Europe and the world were undergoing a profound “crisis of civilization” [...].

The idea of “a crisis of civilisation” has always been important to fascists, and indeed to many totalitarian groups both in the Western world and elsewhere. For instance, the well-known Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb begins his “Milestones” with the following exclamation:

Mankind today is on the brink of a precipice, not because of the danger of complete annihilation which is hanging over its head – this being just a symptom and not the real disease – but because humanity is devoid of those vital values which are necessary not only for its healthy development but also for its real progress. Even the Western world realises that Western civilization is unable to present any healthy values for the guidance of mankind. It knows that it does not possess anything which will satisfy its own conscience and justify its existence.

To the Nazis, the crisis was multifold. The main culprit of the story was, however, as so many times before: the Jews were of course given most of the blame. The Nazi party was rushing in, ready to save Germany – and Europe in general. Consider these two Nazi posters:

Our last hope – Hitler

Europe is under attack! With the voluntary Flemish legion in the battle against Bolshevism!

Fascism has, like any other ideology, evolved and adopted over time. The parties I have identified as Eurofascist are not directly comparable to the Nazi party, although there are ties to pre- and post-WWII fascism to be found in every single case, and although there are connections to White Power-groups, violent private militias, etc.

What today’s Eurofascists have in common with the fascists of the past is – however – essential. One of the things they do have in common are the claims of an imminent civilisational crisis. This time around it is Muslims who are the enemy – and according to the fascist mythology they are supported by other groups, the ‘inner enemies’: socialists, multiculturalists, European Union-bureaucrats, liberals, etc. “White Europe” is being threatened – there is only one alternative:

Vlaams Belang – the only alternative

It’s quite a leap. I know. But here’s the deal: Vlaams Belang has provable ties to the fascism of the past, and it has provable ties to not-so-nice-fellows even today.

I don’t think every single Fleming who votes for them is a fascist. In fact, I think most of them aren’t. But that does not change the fact that there’s something thorougly rotten about Vlaams Belang. Let us – once again – take a step back in time. Roger Griffin writes:

Another influential French propagandist of fascism’s new Europeanism, however, was Maurice Bardeche (further reading: here, here and – a nasty piece of work – here). His Qu’est-ce que le fascisme? (1961) is a major statement of the principle that the belief in the need for national rebirth (or what I have called `palingenetic ultra-nationalism’) forms the common ground between the most diverse fascist movements and should be channelled into an international crusade against Bolshevism and Americanization.

In the early 1950s he was already talking of the need for Euro-MPs to coordinate the creation of a European empire with its own colonies (cf. Mosley’s `Eurafrica’) declaring that `the aim of this European revolution will be the spiritual regeneration of Man, society and the state’.

It should be noted en passant that the intransigent and murderous stand taken by the French `liberal’ state against Algerie Francaise to resist forced decolonization was vociferously supported in such Eurofascist periodicals as Jeune Europe, Europe-Afrique, and Junges Europa. If post-war German fascism lacked an ideologue of the originality and output of Evola or Bardeche, it certainly has not been short of pan-European initiatives.

In 1949 former SS Officer Arthur Erhardt founded the monthly Nation Europa which, as its subtitle makes clear, sets out to be a forum for all those who cherished the dream of a post-liberal and anti-communist `European New Order’. This periodical has become one of the pillars of ecumenical fascist publicism and propaganda. [...] It has thus been well placed to accommodate the many new permutations of palingenetic ultra-nationalism which have arisen since 1945 and to embrace as comrades in arms the organizations and parties which covertly or overtly seek to promote them (e.g. in recent years Le Pen’s Front National, Frey’s Deutsche Volksunion, Schoenhuber’s Republikaner and Terreblanche’s Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging). It has also been at pains to capitalise on all conflicts between European and non-European cultures (e.g. in Algeria and South Africa).

One of the most interesting characters of those mentioned above is Maurice Bardèche, the French neo-fascist intellectual. Close to the collaborationist Robert Brasillach (his brother-in-law and a political inspiration source), Bàrdeche wrote several books before Qu’est-ce que le fascisme? – including Nuremberg ou la Terre Promise (Nuremberg or the Promised Land, one English translation found here). This book is a classic of holocaust revisionism.

In “Nuremberg…” Bardèche claims that that at least part of the evidence regarding the concentration camps have been falsified, and that the deaths that occured there were caused by war-related privations, including starvation and illness. According to Bardèche, the final solution of the Nazis was really referring to a transfer of the Jews to «what they called a Jewish reservate, a kind of European ghetto, a Jewish fatherland reestablished in the east».

Still, Bardèche admitted that there was a «will to exterminate the Jews» and that there were «deportations of Jews» and of «certain Frenchmen who had accepted or seemed to have accepted the Jewish cause».

The whole question, Bardèche claims, is why the Germans made this distinction. He answers himself:

The Jews were originally strangers, who were first allowed into this country with prudence – and then in always increasing numbers as some of them gained influence. In spite of this hospitality that was given them, they did not refrain themselves from taking part in the political discussions of our country. Regarding whether we should transform the invasion of Czechoslovakia or the war in Poland into a European war, they did not hesitate to fight against any spirit of reconciliation, i.e. to involve our country in a unfortunate, but desirable war, because it was directed against an enemy of their race. We ceased to be a great nation. In reality, we maybe even ceased to be an independent people, because their wealth and their influence made their viewpoint prevail over that of those French who where concerned with protecting their ground and keeping peace.

In other words, Bardèche found that the Jews were themselves to blame for their deportation and for their deaths:

They say today that they are true to this land which their parents did not know, and that they understand better than us the wisdom and mission of this country, of which some of them can hardly speak the language.

They divided us, they claimed the blood of the best and purest, and they were delighted and still are delighted with our deaths. They gave us the right to say that this war they wanted was their war, and not ours. They paid the price that is paid in all wars. We have the right not to count their deaths with our deaths.

Bardèche was soon to join up with other fascists around Europe, including Oswald Mosley in England and Per Engdahl in Sweden. In 1951, Engdahl hosted an international meeting of key European fascists leaders in the southern Swedish city of Malmö, leading to the foundation of the European Social Movement, perhaps better known simply as the Malmö Movement.

In the same period, Bardèches book was translated into Dutch. The translator’s name was Karel Dillen, the man who was eventually to found Vlaams Nationale Partij – the party which soon became Vlaams Blok and today is known as Vlaams Belang.

Was it a youthful mistake from Dillen’s side, or was it something more? Consider the following:

- Dillen and Bardèche kept in contact in many years to come.

- Roeland Raes, later a member of parliament for VB, wrote a series of articles in Dietsland-Europa throughout 1980. The articles were titled: «A great European: Maurice Bardèche» and discussed all the works of Bardèche from 1947 on.

«To us, Bardèche is one of the most gifted writers of the nationalist camp», Raes noted, «an unusually brave man and a great European intellectual». He also pointed out that Flemish nationalists owe Bardèche thanks for contributing to «a large part» of their political thinking.

According to Raes, Bardèches’ work puts down the basic demands for «real national-revolutionary attitude and action»

- In 2000, the son of Karel Dillen, Koen Dillen, writes an article in the Vlaams Blok-magazine, called “In the library of my father”. Parts of the article tells the story of Brasillach and Bardèche. One interesting quote found on the (Leftist) site blokwatch.be:

Brasillach was murdered during the repression in France. His works showed my father the way to the French belletrie (belles-lettres, art of writing), if I may use this old-fashioned word.

And:

Loyalty to a lost cause and “pessimisme gai”: this was also a heritage my father received from France.

At the end of this post, let’s go back – once again – to Roger Griffin. He adds another interesting piece to the puzzle:

Perhaps because of its size, Belgium’s fascists have since 1945 been prominent instigators of pan-Europeanism in tandem with the country’s central role in the EC. The Congo crisis was as important a catalyst to the Belgian New Europe myth as the Algerian War was to the French one, and gave birth to the group Jeune Europe, which folded in 1968 but has left a number of heirs, notably Les Groupes Revolution Europe, Jeune Garde d’Occident, and the Parti Europeen. The Flemish counterpart to such groupings, the Flemish Militants Order (VMO or Odal Group, now subsumed within the Vlaams Blok or Flemish Bloc) has been playing a major role in coordinating links with racist [and] fascist groups in Europe. As for publicistic output, we have already noted Europe Reele, but the most influential magazine to spread the ecumenical gospel after Nation Europa is Nouvel Europe Magazine which was launched way back in 1944, even before the Nazi defeat. A Flemish equivalent to Jeune Europe is Were Di, which in magazines such as Dietsland-Europa and Rebel seeks to promote the vision of a creation of a greater Flanders or `Dietsland’ within a reborn Europe.

The VMO, Were Di, Dietsland-Europa, the Odal Group, all of them have ties to Vlaams Belang.

Tøvete, Berg!

Hallgrim Berg har i eit innlegg gått til åtak på vår artikkel «De usynlege terroristene». Det kan verka som han synest det er fælt gale at nokon tek opp høgreekstrem terrorisme, og meiner tydelegvis at det i seg sjølv er det same som å «minimalisere negative utslag av den (synlege) islamistiske terrorismen». Dette er tøvete.

Islamistisk terrorisme er sjølvsagt eit reelt trugsmål. Den som klarar å lesa noko anna ut av artikkelen Shoaib Sultan og underteikna leverte må vera mildt sagt kreativ. Vårt poeng er ikkje at fokus på islamistisk terrorisme ikkje er på sin plass, vårt poeng er at høgreekstrem terrorisme diverre vert oversett i det terrorbilete ein får servert i media.

Berg er sjølvsagt også irritert over at me hevdar at han overser høgreekstrem terror i USA, og kjeftar på oss for å ikkje ha lese boka me kritiserer. Det er nok av ting å kritisera i Berg si bok, men den kritikken me kom med var faktisk ikkje retta mot boka i det heile – så kanskje Berg burde lesa artikkelen vår på ny? Det me kritiserte var henta frå ein kronikk Berg skreiv i Dagbladet i samband med lanseringa av boka. Der heiter det:

«[D]et som er felles for samtlege anslag mot USA [sidan 1981], er at det er islamistiske terroristar som står bak».

Sidan Berg sjølv skriv om Timothy McVeigh i sitt amerikabrev er han sjølvsagt pinleg klar over at dette er heilt bort i vegg og staur. Bombinga av Alfred P. Murrah-bygninga i Oklahoma City er det nest-største terroråtak i USA si historie, hende i 1995, og det var ikkje islamistar som stod bak. I sin kronikk i Dagbladet har Berg diverre «gløymt» det.

Bakgrunn

Islamistisk terrorisme er utvilsamt ein del av terrorbiletet i både USA og Europa, og det er ingen tvil om at islamistar er i stand til å gjennomføra blodige terroråtak. Men det er fleire delar av terrorbiletet eit einaugd fokus på islamistisk terrorisme kan føra til at ein overser, og etter mi oppfatting er den såkalla høgreekstreme terrorismen viktigast i denne samanhang.

Det var også bodskapen i artikkelen Shoaib Sultan og eg leverte i Samtiden 2-2007.

I 1995 vart som nemnd 168 menneske drept i bombeaksjonen i Oklahoma City, med høgreekstremisten Timothy McVeigh som hovudmann. Berg ynskjer gjerne å sjå på han som ein “stoffvridd einstøing”, men røyndomen er sjølvsagt ikkje heilt så enkel. For det fyrste er faktisk også Terry Nichols dømd for si rolle i bombeåtaket. Meir sentralt er imidlertid det Mike German, ein tidlegare FBI-agent med erfaring frå innanlands anti-terrorverksemd skreiv i Washington Post i juni 2005:

The FBI has long maintained that Timothy McVeigh, who was executed in 2001 for the Oklahoma City bombing that claimed 168 lives, was the prototypical “lone wolf” terrorist and that anyone implicated in the bombing conspiracy is behind bars. But old loose ends and troubling new revelations about McVeigh’s association with white supremacist groups have led many people to wonder whether a wider conspiracy was behind the bombing that took place just over 10 years ago. Rep. Dana Rohrabacher, a California Republican, is considering holding hearings to try to answer these lingering questions. What he is likely to discover is not a disagreement over the facts, but a fundamental misperception of how most extremist groups operate.

Det er ei kjensgjerning at McVeigh drog inspirasjon frå høgreekstreme grupper og litteratur:

Tim McVeigh seemed able to find a militia meeting wherever he went. He was linked to militia groups in Arizona and Michigan, white supremacist groups in Oklahoma and Missouri, and at gun shows he sold copies of “The Turner Diaries,” a racist novel written by the founder of a neo-Nazi organization. No one finds such groups by accident.

McVeigh var ein del av ei rørsle, og som German skriv:

“Lone extremism” is not a phenomenon; it’s a technique, a ruse designed to subvert the criminal justice system. McVeigh did act as a lone extremist, as the FBI says. He was trained to do it this way. But his act of lone extremism was part of an ongoing conspiracy that continues to inspire violent attacks to this day, and to close our eyes to this conspiracy is to deny reality. It’s a matter of connecting the dots.

Året etter Oklahoma City-bombinga gjennomførte ein annan høgreekstremist, Eric Robert Rudolph eit bombeåtak under Atlanta-OL. Rudolph forklarte seinare åtaket på følgjande vis:

In the summer of 1996, the world converged upon Atlanta for the Olympic Games. Under the protection and auspices of the regime in Washington millions of people came to celebrate the ideals of global socialism. Multinational corporations spent billions of dollars, and Washington organized an army of security to protect these best of all games. Even though the conception and purpose of the so-called Olympic movement is to promote the values of global socialism, as perfectly expressed in the song “Imagine” by John Lennon, which was the theme of the 1996 Games even though the purpose of the Olympics is to promote these despicable ideals, the purpose of the attack on July 27 was to confound, anger and embarrass the Washington government in the eyes of the world for its abominable sanctioning of abortion on demand.

The plan was to force the cancellation of the Games, or at least create a state of insecurity to empty the streets around the venues and thereby eat into the vast amounts of money invested.

Rudolph stod for øvrig bak fleire andre bombeaksjonar i USA på nittitalet, blant anna ein aksjon mot ein nattklubb der mange homofile vanka. Også han vart framstilt som “lone nut”, også han hadde koplingar til ei breiare rørsle.
Hallgrim Berg verkar ikkje å vera særleg viljug til å trekkja liner frå punkt til punkt når det gjeld høgreekstrem terrorisme, noko som er forunderleg med tanke på dei imponerande strekteikningane han får til i samband med islam.

Den politiske kommentatoren Rick Perlstein skriv:

If the media does not start connecting some dots, they will have abdicated their citizenship duties. How many times has the nation potentially come within a hair’s breadth of suffering a right-wing terrorist attack this spring? As of today, three, or possibly six times – at least that we know about.

The article in Information was a critical response from Frederik Stjernfeldt on Swedish journalist Stefan Jonsson’s analysis of the Danish debate on immigration. Jonsson’s main point was that the Danes have become obsessed with Islam. Stjernfeldt writes:

“The false understanding of constant cultural essences has become one of the premisses of the debate”. This is one of the critical comments on the Danish debate from Stefan Jonsson. Here, I think he is completely correct. Of course, it concerns Islam, and the idea of Islam as a constant cultural essence it thriving both on the right-wing – where Islam is routinely seen as a culture with no hope for improvement, quickly associated with terrorism – and on the left-wing – where Islam is, just as routinely, seen as made up by poor, innocent victims alone, people whose picturesque culture must be protected.

Many on the left would not like to admit it, but this description is more than a caricature. Some left-wingers are drawn from their (often justified) criticism against Western powers (i.e. the United States) to support of anyone who fights against these same powers. Those who struggle against the perceived “imperialist hegemony” are then automatically understood as having noble intentions, simply because they are the enemy of the enemy. In this way, the West is made into an essence and understood as necessarily ‘evil’.

When right-wingers ask ‘do you want Saddam back, then?’ they are mostly discussing against strawmen built by themselves. But amongst that army of strawmen, some real people on the left have also found refugee. Henning Holm mentions Carsten Kofoed. I could think of others, too.

Another aspect, which I see as more important, is the fact that many of Europe’s progressive left-wing parties have shun away from discussing problems surrounding immigration and immigrant communities. Some feminist groups are quick to protest against the opening of a new sex store, connecting sex stores with the porn industry, but are slow to fight against brutal suppression of immigrant women. Some left-wingers, and people on the liberal right, are quick to criticise Christian homophobia, but slow to criticise Muslim homophobia. Seen in that light, the growth of various populist right and even neo-fascist parties is not difficult to explain. They are seen as the only one standing up for Western values; when in fact, they oppose central tenets of a Western democracy.

But then, how should the left wing and the liberal right address these problems? I have stolen Henning Holm’s list and slightly adopted it:

1. Fight against stupid anti-Americanism based on monolithic thinking, just as you would fight against stupid Islamophobia based on the same.

2. Do not set lower standards for immigrants or minorities than for anyone else. This is racism reverted. If someone is spouting Jew-hatred or homophobia, they should be confronted, regardless of their ethnic, cultural or religious background. Also, do not excuse someone’s despicable actions or attitudes because they are in agreement with you on other areas.

3. Do not let the socalled far right define the debate. Opposition to stricter rules on family reunions is not the same as support of forced marriages. Confronting the views of the far right is good, but critique coupled with alternative suggestions to solve actual problems is better.

4. The “big debate” on Islam should be modularised. It is pointless to discuss the Taliban in the same context as youth crime in European ghettos, and stupid to discuss female genital mutilation in the same setting as the Iraq war. The main challenges of integration have little to do with 1960s Egyptian radicalism and even less to do with Ottoman policy in Southern Bulgaria.

5. The debate should be deislamified. The problem with forced marriages is not that they take place in Islamic cultures, but that people are married against their will. The problem with female genital mutilation is not that the tradition is practiced in some Muslim countries, but that the tradition is practiced at all. The problem with al Qa’ida is not that they pray to Allah, but that they are involved in terrorism. These problems should be seen in the most relevant context(s), which often does not include the religious one.

Often it is used in the same kind of context as the American radio host Michael Savage (a pseudonym for Dr. Michael Alan Weiner) – the best-selling author of “Liberalism is a Mental Disorder” and other books – uses it, as an excuse for attacking the “vermin of the Left”, “the verminist traitors at MSNBC” and “the scum at CBS”:

You’re talking about four or five outlets with maybe one czar — or two czars rather, three maybe, at the top, in control of the news. They’re all the product of the ’60s. They’re vehemently anti-military. Vehemently anti-war. And ultimately suicidal. And they are dangerous for your children and other living creatures. If they airbrush the enemy, and they have sympathy for the enemy, and they paint horns on our soldiers, and have hatred for our soldiers. And if the enemy is willing to die for their cause, and our administration is not even willing to kill for our survival we are going to lose this war against radical Islam or Islamofascism.

These “very evil” and “very dangerous” people in the media were apparently paying too much attention to American human rights abuse at Abu Ghraib, and not focusing enough on the evils of “these sub-humans”, Savage’s word for Iraqi prisoners. When he states “a thousand of them should be killed tomorrow. I think a thousand of them held in the Iraqi prison should be given 24 hour — a trial and executed. I think they need to be shown that we are not going to roll over to them. It won’t happen. It won’t happen because of the CBS Communists”.

Hearing Michael Savage spout his very own variant of modern-day fascism it is tempting to agree with Joseph Sobran, who calls Islamofascism “nothing but an empty propaganda term, [...] crafted to create hysteria”, “the destruction of any sense of proportion”.

It is tempting. But I do not agree with Sobran.

-

Historically, fascism did not go away after the Second World War. It did not die with Hitler or Mussolini. It did not simply disappear. The ideology survived in different forms throughout Europe; in Germany, in Sweden, in England, in France, in Belgium, in Italy, and today it is very much alive in several of these countries and perhaps even more so in Russia and some former East Bloc countries. And, of course, the ideas of fascism did not simply stop at the Bosporus strait or upon reaching the Mediterranean. In Turkey, the Bozkurtlar (Grey Wolves) was founded in 1969, inspired by Giovanni Gentile, the philosopher of Italian fascism.

In the Arab world, the movement with the perhaps most obvious similarities to fascism was founded in 1940 by the Syrian Christian Michel Aflaq. His ideology combined anti-colonialism, pan-Arabism, nationalism and ideas on an Arab socialism, and the movement he founded was Ba’ath (meaning renaissance or resurrecion). The Ba’ath party eventually came to power in both Iraq and Syria. “It was he who created the Party”, Saddam Hussein told an interviewer in 1980. “How could I possibly forget what Michel Aflaq did for me? If it were not for him, I would never have come to this position”. As the Italian historian and diplomat Sergio Romana pointed out in Corriere della Serra in August (an English translation is found here), there’s an obvious irony in this: From 1980 to 1988, the United States was on the side of the fascists against the Islamists [of Iran].

But the Ba’ath-party was not the only party to draw inspiration and support from European fascists. A number of Arab nationalist movements teamed up with the Nazis, in the hope that the Germans could help them rid their countries of British and French influence. Romana writes:

At the end of 1941, as the Africa Korps advanced toward Alexandria, a group of Egyptian officers gathered intelligence for Rommel’s General Staff on the movement of British troops.

One of their leaders was Anwar al-Sadat, who became President of Egypt following the death of Nasser. Several crossed through the lines to join Axis troops only to reappear next to Nasser during the 1952 revolution. Jean Lacouture, in his 1971 biography of Nasser, recounted that during those days, while the Germans and the British were fighting in al-Alamein, there were demonstrations in Cairo and in Alexandria. The crowd chanted the praises of Rommel and mangled Mussolini’s name calling him Mussa Nili, the Moses of the Nile.

Often, these connections between Arab nationalists and European fascists were a union based on the principle of the enemy of my enemy being a friend. However, the unquestioned authority of the leader, a single party, the role of the armed forces and the bureaucracy etc. did have ideological appeal and the anti-Semitism of today’s Arab societies is to a large degree a direct import from the West.

Early Islamists also drew inspiration from fascist thinkers. Still, I do not think it is wise to describe Islamist ideology as a whole as Islamofascism. In fact, Islamism draws its inspiration from so many different sources that it is difficult to talk of Islamism as a whole at all. Rather, one could consider Islamism a whole range of different ideologies with only a few common traits, ranging from the jihadism of al Qa’eda to Muslim variants of European Christian Democratic parties. To group them all together is like identifying Swedish Social Democracy with Kim Il Sung’s Juche ideology. It might give you the status of a hero in parts of the blogosphere, but it just does not make much sense.

But does it then make sense to speak of some socalled Islamist thinkers as Islamofascists? Stephen Schwartz writes about a speaker at a pro-Hezbollah demonstration:

The Washington Post of August 14 quoted a speaker at a pro-Hezbollah demonstration in Washington, as follows: “‘Mr. Bush: Stop calling Islam “Islamic fascism,’ said Esam Omesh, president of the Muslim American Society, prompting a massive roar from the crowd. He said there is no such thing, ‘just as there is no such thing as Christian fascism.’”

As Schwartz points out that is simply not true. There is such a thing as Christian fascism:

The fascist Iron Guard in Romania during the interwar period and in the second world war was explicitly Christian–its official title was the “Legion of the Archangel Michael;” Christian fascism also exists in the form of Ulster Protestant terrorism, and was visible in the (Catholic) Blue Shirt movement active in the Irish Free State during the 1920s and 1930s.

Both the Iron Guard and the Blue Shirts attracted noted intellectuals; the cultural theorist Mircea Eliade in the first case, the poet W.B Yeats in the second. Many similar cases could be cited. It is also significant that Mr. Omesh did not deny the existence of “Jewish fascism”–doubtless because in his milieu, the term is commonly directed against Israel. Israel is not a fascist state, although some marginal, ultra-extremist Jewish groups could be so described.

-

Perhaps we should not only look at fascism from a historical point of view, but also from an ideological point of view? In the article quoted above, Schwartz draws a number of a parallels between the ideology of various extremist groups and the fascists of Italy and Germany. But are these paralells enough to call these Islamic extremists fascists? And what could we achieve by labelling them as such?

One thing we could hope to achieve is an end to the stupidity of parts of the left. If Hizb’allah was recognised as being a fascist organisation, self-declared anti-fascists might have been more reluctant supporting them. And while there’s a risk of obscuring the actual ideology of for instance jihadist groups by referring to them as fascist, there is a chance that the designation might lead to increased understanding on one point: some of the underlying reasons for the blossoming of radical Islamist thinking in parts of the Middle East and amongst the Muslim diaspora in the West could become clearer. After all, German Nazism is rarely seen entirely out of its historical, economical and social contexts. Radical Islamism often is.

Does Islamofascism exist? In “The Anatomy of Fascism”, Robert O. Paxton writes:

Fascism may be defined as a form of political behavior marked by obsessive preoccupation with community decline, humiliation, or victim-hood and by compensatory cults of unity, energy, and purity, in which a mass-based party of committed nationalist militants, working in uneasy but effective collaboration with traditional elites, abandons democratic liberties and pursues with redemptive violence and without ethical or legal restraints goals of internal cleansing and external expansion.

Replace “nationalist” with “religious” and I’d say you come pretty close.

^{Update: A typo had sneaked in, identifying the wrong Paxton as the author of “The Anatomy of Fascism”. Thanks to the reader who pointed out this mistake.}

Det har han sjølvsagt heilt rett i. Dersom venstresida berre klarer å appellera til utdanka visesongarar, akademikarar og lærarar med lilla skjerf vil ho ikkje klara å mønstra særleg støtte. Arbeidarklassen, som rett nok er ein konstruksjon, vil finna seg andre å stemma på eller støtta.

Her i Belgia er det val til helga, og i Antwerpen kjem antakeleg truleg rundt ein tredjedel til å stemma på det høgreekstreme partiet Vlaams Belang (VB), eit parti som fyrst og fremst er innvandrarfiendtleg, men som også er homofiendtleg og ikkje akkurat landets sterkaste forsvarar av sosiale rettar.

Men Vlaams Belang er ikkje den einaste reaksjonære rørsla med fotfeste i Antwerpen. Også Arab European League (AEL), har ein del støtte i byen. Til liks med Vlaams Belang er denne rørsla prega av militant nasjonalistisk tankegods. Til liks med Vlaams Belang er rørsla homofiendtleg. Men den panarabistiske rørsla er veldig forskjellig frå Vlaams Belang på eit område: Medan venstrepartiet Partij van de Arbeid foraktar VB, med god grunn, hadde dei nokre år attende eit valsamarbeid med AEL. Kva var det som fekk radikale sosialistar til å samarbeida med reaksjonære nasjonalistar? Kva er det, for den del, som får europeiske progressive til å stø halvfascistiske grupper som libanesiske Hizb’allah?

Ein artikkel i avisa til Internasjonale Sosialistar, som har det ikkje særleg originale namnet Gnisten, kan kanskje vera med på å gje svaret. Der vert det sagt, på og mellom linene, sagt at dei på venstresida som ikkje stør Hizb’allah gjer seg skuldig i islamofobi. – Sosialistar må velja side, skriv Gnisten.

Men kva side skal ein velja? Det militaristiske Israel? Det reaksjonære Hizb’allah? Skakkjørt amerikansk utanrikspolitikk? Ei motstandsrørsle utgjort av fanatiske islamistar som ikkje nøler med å angripa eiga sivilbefolking? AEL, fordi dei sloss mot rasisme? Vlaams Belang, fordi dei trass alt set søkjelyset på ein del verkelege problem ingen av dei andre partia tek opp i særleg grad? Set ein seg på ein moralsk pidestal om ein let vera å velja nokon av desse alternativa? Kanskje. Om det ikkje hadde vore for at det finst andre alternativ.

I boka “Ni putes, ni soumises” skriv franske Fadela Amara om rørsla med same namn (“Ikkje horer, og ikkje underkua”). I ghettoar i Frankrike står unge jenter under dobbelt press: ikkje berre vert dei utsett for rasisme og diskriminering, dei er også offer for ein machokultur som har vokse fram i krysspunktet mellom motløyse, konservatisme og radikal islamisme. Amara og andre tok opp kampen og sette i stand ein marsj for å protestera mot denne doble undertrykkinga. Men dei identifiserte seg, i byrjinga, ikkje med feminismen. Amara hadde sjølv teke del i feministiske møter, men hadde fort gjeve det opp, sidan det aldri vart diskutert noko konkret, samtaletemaa var berre feministisk teori og globalisering,

Når marsjen vel var i gang fekk “Ni Putes, Ni Soumises” kjeft. Amara legg ikkje fingrane mellom når ho skriv om dette, og det går ann å seia seg ueinig i ein del av det ho målber. Likevel er det verd å sitera i sin heilskap, det kan kanskje inspirera til ein debatt om kva venstresida har gjort og kva ho burde gjera.
Her frå den engelske utgåva “Breaking the Silence”, som kom ut i sumar:

Others accused me of espousing neocolonialism, of betraying my own community origins – showing their real intentions – and of mistreating Islam, thus conflating Islam and Islamism (fundamentalism) in a vicious and shameful way. I was surprised, however, to discover that those who thought they were dealing a death blow, even well-known intellectuals among them, are not the children of immigrants. And several of them had heard about the social problems in the projects only from broadcasts on the evening televised news program.

These same individuals were silent when the majority of the young women from the housing projects were fighting, and are still fighting, to resist pressures from the neighborhood. These same people accuse supporters of the headscarf ban of being racist and Islam-haters. For them, the headscarf is only a detail, buried in a list of global demands against a failing system. From their viewpoint, how could anyone dare to punish the victims who wear headscarves when France today refuses to face and assume responsibility for its colonial past, even its colonial present!

Islamists use similar arguments in the housing projects to accredit their own rhetoric. As they say, they are obviously right, since even some intellectuals recognize the same truths.

Bravo to these defenders of freedom: when you talk to them about social equality, they agree; when you talk to them about exclusion, the say we must fight against it; but when you talk to them about secularism, they stumble because they lack the courage to follow their reasoning to a logical conclusion. Their thinking is nothing more than a recasting of the tenets of secularism. They have never believed in it as a means of emancipation. They dare not affirm it loud and clear because they know that they will be attacked by our citizens at election time. They employ other methods to impose their viewpoints.

As the fundamentalist Islamists do, they flatter those who are susceptible to their discourse. A portion of the new generation can find favour with them, but only by agreeing to wallow in the status of victim, a position that has served them for years. Carried to absurdity, it justifies all forms of violence carried out by victims, because victims can not be seen as perpetrators of violence.

The more learned of these standard-bearers of the ideology of victimisation believe that the growing Islamism we have noted is only the expression of a break with the system. For this reason, these intellectuals are convinced that the “revolutionary” energies behind this minority deserve their support. Strange reasoning that requires its proponents to be blind and deaf, in light of the ravages of Islamism today, primarily in Muslim countries and especially against women. The feminist movements in these countries and in others have alerted us to their oppression.

On the pretext of advocating cultural relativism, therefore, the respect of cultures and traditions (even if the latter diminish personal physical and moral integrity), these manipulators think and speak for others. Observing them and listening to them only confirm my doubts about their misalliance with political Islam. Their cultural relativist mode of thinking was already unacceptable when it advocated tolerance of polygamy, excision and sexual inequality; it is all the more so in its use of Islam for political ends.

Hizb’allah er nok revolusjonære i at dei ynskjer seg eit radikalt annleis samfunn. Men det er ikkje min revolusjon, om eg ikkje kan dansa til han.